Proper Names

Mill: Proper names denote but do not connote - i.e., they are not disguised descriptions:

"A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object."

Frege disagrees. He argues that proper names have both a reference (denotation) and a sense (connotation) - Hesperus denotes the same object as Phosphorus but does not connote the same. Evidence: "Hesperus is Hesperus" is analytic, but "Hesperus is Phosphorus" is synthetic. [Note: Kripke rejects this – see later.]

Russell also disagrees, claiming that proper names are just disguised definite descriptions. Thus "Hesperus" just becomes some complicated definite description (which in turn is analyzed away and is not the logical subject of a predicate).

Searle agrees that proper names have senses.

First Argument (250.1):

  1. We teach use of proper names by (a) identifying an object, and (b) explaining that this name applies to that object
  2. We can only do (a) by (i) ostension, or (ii) description, "and in both cases, we identify the object in virtue of certain of its characteristics"
  3. Therefore, "the rules for a proper name must somehow be logically tied to particular characteristics of the object in such a way that the name has a sense as well as a reference... how, unless the names has a sense, is it to be correlated with the object?"
Millian rebuttal:
  1. The characteristics mentioned above are not rules for using the name, just pedagogical tools for teaching the use. This is demonstrated because:
  2. We teach the use of ‘Aristotle’ by saying "Greek philosopher born in Stagira".
  3. Student learns more about Aristotle, continuing to use it in the same way, finds out that Aristotle was not born in Stagira.
  4. According to the Fregean view, either the meaning of Aristotle has changed, or we have discovered that ‘Aristotle’ did not really exist. But neither is true, so, by reducto ad absurdum, the Fregean view is mistaken.
Searle’s response:

The Millian view implies that saying of ‘Aristotle’ that ‘he never existed’ must mean simply ‘Aristotle never had a referent.’ But this is not what "Aristotle never existed" means, because if it were, then finding an Aristotle living in Hoboken in 1903 would disprove that claim, and it doesn’t. Furthermore, if we found out that if all the things we say of Aristotle were true of nobody or of many different people in different times, then we would count that as evidence that Aristotle did never exist. Therefore, names have a sense necessarily but a referent only contingently.

SUMMARY:

Suggestion to flesh out the Fregean view: Names are shorthand descriptions - how about the complete description of the object? This has weird consequences:
  1. Any true statement about the object, "Aristotle is (e.g.) Plato’s best student" turns out to be analytic.
  2. Any false statement would be a contradiction
  3. The meaning of the name would change every time there was any change in the object
  4. (Possibly) the identity of the object would change with every change
  5. The name would have different meanings for different people
Suggestion (2): "Aristotle" means "object originally dubbed Aristotle". BUT:

"Named ‘Aristotle’" is a universal term, but "Aristotle" is a proper name

Therefore "This is named ‘Aristotle’" is necessary, but not sufficient for the truth of "This is Aristotle" (recall the Aristotle in Hoboken)

So where do we go from here? Compare function of proper names with other singular referring expressions.

  1. Demonstratives (this, that): presuppose stage settings or context for their reference to be successful. PNs do not.
  2. Definite Descriptions: specify characteristics, and refer only in virtue of those characteristics (attributive sense). PNs do not specify particular characteristics.
SOLUTION: "referring uses of "Aristotle" presuppose (Strawson) the existence of an object of whom a sufficient but so far unspecified number of [defining] characteristics are true." [252.1/.2]

PNs are useful precisely because they cannot be replaced by precise definite descriptions. "they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object. They function not as descriptions [so Russell was wrong] but as pegs on which to hang descriptions." [253.1]

SUM:

Proper names have a sense, not because they are used to describe or specify characteristics of objects, but because they are logically connected (in a "loose sort of way") with characteristics of the object.

So: "Aristotle never existed" asserts that a sufficient number of the conventional presuppositions, descriptive statements, of referring uses of "Aristotle" are false. [253.2]

Kripke (pp. 255-268)

Names and Definite Descriptions are both designators.
Proper Names are rigid designators – i.e., refer to the same individual in every world in which s/he/it appears. Strongly rigid designators refer to things that exist in every possible world (if there are any).

Definite descriptions are nonrigid (or "accidental" or "flaccid") designators – refer to whatever-it-is fits their description in each world.

THEREFORE: "Aristotle is the greatest philosopher" includes two designators, one rigid ("Aristotle") and one nonrigid ("the greatest philosopher"). Thus it expresses a contingent truth (because there are some worlds where Aristotle is not the greatest philosopher).

This means that "Aristotle" does not in any way mean (something that includes) "the greatest philosopher". In fact, it doesn’t mean anything. What’s more, "the greatest philosopher" does not even help to fix the reference of Aristotle (except in this particular world).*

[BUT "Hesperus is Phosphorus" or "Cicero is Tully" are necessary truths. "Cicero" and "Tully" could refer to two different people in one world, but then "Cicero" would not be our Cicero.]

Criticism of *: Grayling, pp.61-65 – Problem of Transworld Identity

In world 1, x has properties {p,q,r}, y has properties {s,t,u}
In world 2, y has properties {p,q,r}, x has properties {s,t,u}

Problem: x-in-W2 is indiscernible from y-in-W2 (and vice versa), which violates the principle of identity of indiscernibles, PLUS x-in-W1 shares no feature with x-in-W2, so in what sense are they "the same" object?

Kripke’s response: p. 259 – we just can refer to Nixon in all possible worlds (otherwise counterfactuals would be meaningless, and they’re not). Also remember (contra Lewis) Possible Worlds aren’t real.

Theses of Searlian theory (259.2):

  1. The statement, "If X exists then X has most of the family (cluster) of properties P" expresses a necessary truth.
FALSE (says Kripke) because of what he’s just said. Aristotle could be a man living in Hoboken in 1903, even one not called Aristotle(!)
  1. If most of the Ps are satisfied by one unique object y, then yis the referent of X
FALSE: suppose all I know about Peano is that he discovered the "Peano axioms" – that means the complete set of Ps is "the discoverer of the Peano Axioms". But it turns out that Dedekind fits that description and not Peano. If (3) were true then I would have been referring to Dedekind when I used "Peano" in the past. But I did not! QED

Gareth Evans

Description Theories of Names:

  1. D.T. of Speaker’s Denotation:

    2. A name "N.N." denotes X upon a particular occasion of its use by a speaker S just in case X is that which satisfies most of the descriptions P such that S would assent to "N.N. is P". If the speaker has no individuating information, he will denote nothing.
  2. D.T. of What a Name Denotes:

    3. Associated with a name used by a community of speakers is a set of descriptions cullable from their beliefs which an item has to satisfy to be the bearer of the name.
Kripke’s attack on "the" description theory does not affect (b) [in particular, K. claims the DT ignores the social character of naming]

Two ways to understand (a):

The strong thesis: that fitting the description is sufficient for the user of the name to refer to an object.

If this were so, then in Kripke’s example, someone using "Peano" has actually been referring to Dedekind. Clearly they are not, Evans agrees, but he also doubts whether anyone has actually held the strong thesis.

The weak thesis: that some descriptive identification is necessary for a speaker to denote something.
[Kripke’s attack: user of "Peano" actually denotes Peano, despite his description not fitting Peano, therefore descriptions not necessary]

Evans: the weak thesis consists of two claims
1) the denotation of a name is determined by what speakers intend to refer to by using the name

2) the object a speaker intends to refer to by her use of a name is that which satisfies or fits the majority of descriptions that make up the cluster of information which the speaker has associated with the name

(2) is an incorrect "Philosophy of Mind": ignores possibility of contextual determination. For example, you can be in love with one identical twin just because you met her, and only be in love with that one, but if God looked into your mind at your description of her, He wouldn’t be able to tell which one. Therefore "fit" isn’t sufficient. "Fit" is not necessary either - (see comparison with seeing, p. 277) suppose my description happens to match perfectly something on the other side of the universe - do I denote that object with my use of the name, despite the fact that there is no causal link between it and me? No.

Causal Theory of Names:
I. A speaker S, using a name "NN" on a particular occasion will denote some item x if there is a causal chain of reference-preserving links leading back from S’s use on that occasion ultimately to the item x itself being involved in either an explicit baptism or a gradual acquisition of nicknames.

II.  S1’s transmission of "NN" to S2 constitutes a reference-preserving link only if S1 intends to be using the name with the same denotation as S0 (from whom S1 learnt "NN").
III.  THUS: If my use of "Cicero" at time t is a causal consequence of my exposure to other speakers using "Cicero" to denote Cicero, then I successfully denote Cicero by my utterance of "Cicero" at t.

Support for (III): Pub conversation about "Louis" (p. 274) [Also seems to count against Description Theory]

BUT: (III) has the further, unwanted consequence that if S says years later "Louis was a basketball player", which never happened in the conversation, and has lost all memory of the conversation, he still denotes Louis XIII.

Flaw of Causal Theory: it ignores the importance of surrounding context and "regards the capacity to denote something as a magic trick which has somehow been passed on, and once passed on cannot be lost." In fact, causal origin (except in "mouthpiece" cases) does not have critical role to play.

My use of a name being a consequence of others’ correct denotative use is not NECESSARY: Kingston example [275.2] - I correctly say "Kingston is the capital of Jamaica" even if the person who told me meant a racist joke about Kingston-upon-Thames.

Causal chain to baptism not necessary either: Madagascar and Jack examples (276.1) - "Jack" is so named because some other baby was named that and this person got swapped.

Example of Napoleon:

You refer to the original Napoleon if the switch is made after most of his achievements (case 1), you refer to the replacement (i.e., "Napoleon" is the person who replaced the original) if the switch is made before Napoleon is well-known.

Example of "Turnip":

"Turnip" refers to the original Turnip for a while, eventually being replaced by the later Turnip.  This shows that "Turnip" refers to whomever the information associated with the name is "dominantly of" (see also Twins e.g., on 278.2 - the more we learn about the replacement, the more the information becomes dominantly of the replacement rather than the original, so the referent eventually changes).